Media Sharing in an Unsnoopable Mesh Of Trust At the current time there are multiple ways for various "powers that be" to track what is downloaded through torrents. All they have to do is add the torrent themselves and track the IPs (blocklists notwithstanding). This alternative could potentially result in the file sharing activity being unsnoopable/untrackable: Node A lives in a media sharing benign jurisdiction (define that however you want). Node A sets up a share folder showx_sync. Nodes B, C & D live in a media sharing draconian states (TPP signatories for instance) and are close personal trusted peers of Node A so node B, C & D have the read only key for Node A's showx_sync. Node A uses conventional bittorrenting to download the latest just aired episode of "showx" into the showx_sync folder. It automagically appears in the sync folders of B, C & D. Even if Node A resided in a media sharing draconian state, if they are the person recording the show themselves this could still work. Node B, C & D also have three different close personal trusted peers and share the showx_sync folder each of them with differnt NEW READ ONLY KEYS; Node B with Node E, F& G; Node C with H, I & J; Node D with K, L & M. When Node A adds the latest episode to showx_sync it flows to B, C & D and from them to E,F,G,H,I,J,K,L & M. E,F,G,H,I,J,K,L & M have no knowledge of A. They only know of the single upstream node. E,F,G,H,I,J,K,L & M may have one or more close personal trusted peers of their own and provided they follow the "resync with new read only key" methodology they will only ever see their own close personal trusted peers in their downstream syc logs. Anybody new or untrusted appears they can change the key and read them the riot act before resharing the key. It becomes interesting when Node M is also a close personal trusted peer of Node A. Then we have a mesh (of sorts). An unsnoopable mesh of trust.