affinity

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Posts posted by affinity

  1. Steve was responding to myself during the podcast, but he said something that I think has a solution rather than being a problem.

    Let's say with ssh for instance that you can accept protocol 1 and protocol 2 -- you would want protocol 2 as an improved protocol for ssh. Now a protocol 2 for BTSync.... let every installation have a long generated "secret" for the client, such secret should be able to be set specifically, just like changing ports. Using protocol 2 of BTSync, you send the secret for the sync AND also send the user's own "installation" secret -- so a double length secret now.

    Set your BTSync to only accept protocol 2 so it requires 2 keys, the sync secret plus the unique "installation or personal" secret. You never do the WPS security flaw of saying, right, the secret is correct, now what is the next auth key? You only accept the remote connection IF both the secret and personal key are correct and you give no indication if one or the other is incorrect -- you simply drop the connection and stop it from proceeding any further; that is you don't accept or reject it, but just drop it. When a connection fails due to being dropped, it should have the same effect as having never found the secret in the first place.

    To further secure the installation secret, the user should be able to supply the sha256 of the secret to the approver, by whatever means to help identify themselves -- their own secret is never known by any other party, but the sha256 of the secret is sent.

  2. Although ironically as a password it would be more secure if it was spelt wrong because then it's not dictionary attackable ;)

    No, clever is out, it is not as /easily/ attack-able with a dictionary, but mis-spellings become part of any good dictionary attack, as does replacing letters with number or symbols.... just a larger dictionary, that's all.

    Targeted attack is out of the question on the whole, but random attack isn't /as difficult/, still difficult though.

    Oh and from another post, you can run as many iterations as you like to a secret to strengthen it, but at the end of the day, you still only have so many bits to work with. If the attack was done using just the final bits with custom code, then the strengthening wouldn't even count for anything here.

  3. I think I might give it a shot... syncing my photos to 2nd pc that acts like a backup.

    :)

    Duplicate it on the other machine, carefully to make sure it is all good.

    BTSync is a great syncing tool, but it is not a backup tool; use it wisely and you'll be able to get the benefits of both sync and backup, just think about it and make sure you cover your bases properly.

  4. I have some files synced between my laptop, desktop, and soon will be hooking up my Raspberry Pi as well to have another backup.

    Don't consider BTSync as a backup tool, that it is not. In some respects it can be though..... it is handy that deleted files go to a deleted folder -- but that isn't perfect either; what happens if the same file is repeatedly added and deleted? You may end up with bad files only.

  5. Android has enough problems with side-loading and now some problems with apps gone rogue over time.

    Needing root is just one thing, how can you know that the program itself isn't in any way malicious? If it is malicious, then having root makes it even more dangerous.

  6. I don't get it, what could be simpler, a tgz file with two files in it, one a license file. You create a config file, if you want, then secure the login and you are just about done. Autostart if you need it, but if you've got a server that never stops, then neither does btsync. It's about as simple as you can get. Automating startup is trivial for any sysadmin and not much harder for non-sysadmins.

  7. The UUID needn't be a "standard" type, it can be another full secret.

    Again, maths is maths, people win Lotto -- not many, but they do win. Relying on pure random chance, you would be extremely unlikely to ever be compromised (unless the random generator is somehow flawed, then you are more likely to be compromised), but it is still possible; big numbers don't mean impossible, just extremely unlikely.

  8. If you have a long secret, and I mean really long, say 80+ Base64 chars..... then trying that with a UUID is even more "virtually impossible", but yes it is possible for a lotto winner, however unlikely. If the UUID is long enough, then it would likely be safe even if the secret was accidentally leaked -- the UUID could just as easily be another 80+ Base64 chars, so effectively two secrets to find, doubly secure against random discovery. In any case, it is clear that secure data needs to be secured in other ways than just a single secret (no matter how long the secret is).

  9. Have a long randomgenerated password that you then put in LastPass+yubikey and you have a pretty good security right there! :)

    It doesn't matter how good your secret is, if you can create it, so can a lotto winner. Lock / Unlock .....this will fix the problem ;)

    Of course, you will be much better off with your own generated key, provided it is long enough and not the standard Base32 32 char one.

  10. The combination of username (email address), password _should_ be tough if you use strong passwords; the TOTP code cycles over time, so long as you never broadcast your code at a guessable time (like on a video blog), then your 16 character code used to "secure" the TOTP installation will be safe. Guessing the TOTP code will be harder for the lotto player to succeed as the code is specific to the user account and time based. The randomness of a true lotto winner is quite different, it targets ANY potential secret, not a specific one.

    Guessing the UUID is a similar problem space, you first need to know you have a hit with the secret -- then you either guess of brute force the UUID; so again, a very targeted approach, rather than a purely random, find a winner for any secret.

    Truecrypt can be well secured with a very long pass phrease AND you can use key file(s) too; so long as you do use a suitably long pass phrase and you use a suitable key file, then you should be very safe from a targeted attack particularly.

  11. The size of the secret is almost irrelevant, if people use the standard 32 character Base32 set and don't opt to use >40 character Base64, then they will /always/ be at risk of a lotto winner. A properly implemented two factor auth will not accept one factor unless both factors are correct -- using Google signin with GA will accept your login first, then it will ask for the simple 6 digit TOTP code; of course that is better than not using any two factor (although you already have somewhat two factor with username and password before you get to the 6 digit factor, that is time limited, but only protected by a 16 alphabetic character string).

    Anyway, what I've proposed in another thread is that you should have the ability to "lock" the system and only allow new connections when the system is unlocked and you can watch for each new connection -- each new connection gives a UUID number that, once authorized, will be able to get in when the system is re-locked again. It solves the lotto winner problem. Without such a mechanism, then lotto winners will arise, no matter how unlikely, it will always remain possible -- so you need to encrypt all your files before you place them into a sync folder or use a Truecrypt (or similar) container.